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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS. By H. Lauterpacht. London:
Stevens & Sons Limited, 1950. pp. 475, xvi. 12 10s.
ONE of the paramount problems of our time is how law, including interna-
tional law, can be made best to serve the purpose of maintaining a free society.
In this comprehensive and insightful study Professor Lauterpacht brings to
finest conception and expression his many distinguished contributions to
meeting this problem1 Within its much controverted domain,2 his book is
unique for its clarity in statement of goals, for the realism with which it
describes trends in international doctrine and practice and in conditioning
factors in international society, and for the specificity and cogency of its
recommendations. The author's stated purpose is to study and appraise the
human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter, and subsequent
efforts to make these provisions effective, against "the wider background of
the problem of the subjects of international law and of the interaction of the
law of nations and the law of nature in relation to the enduring issue of human
government-the securing of the natural and inalienable rights of man," 3 and
he breaks his task into three parts: The Rights of Man and the Law of
Nations, Human Rights under the Charter of the United Nations, and The
International Bill of the Rights of Man (comprising the author's own detailed
recommendations for content and implementation).
To establish that human rights are an appropriate concern of international
law and organization, Professor Lauterpacht begins by surveying "The
Subjects of the Law of Nations" and demonstrating that individual human
beings have long been "subjects" of both rights and duties in international
doctrine and practice.4 The shibboleth that only nation-states can be subjects
of international law he disposes of by pointing to the today hardly controver-
tible position of public international bodies and to the growing participation of
private international organizations in important power decisions. The role
1. Such contributions include Ax INTERNATIONAL BiLL OF TEE RiHTs OF MAN
(1945); The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 64 L.Q. REv. 97, 438 (1948); Human
Rights in the International Law Association in REPORT OF THE FoRTY-SECOND CONFER-
ENCE, PRAGu, 1947, 13 (1948) ; and many related books and articles.
2. The controversy in this country is outlined in Report, Committee on United
Nations, Section of International Law, A.B.A. (1950) 112. For discussion and bibli-
ography see Chafee, Federal and State Powers under the U. IV. Covenant on Human
Rights, 1951 Wisc. L. REv. 389; McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Mat in the
World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action, 59 YALE L.J. 60
(1949).
3. P. vii.
4. It may be noted that the principal attack in this country upon the human rights
program has been not so much upon "substantive provisions" as upon the "propriety
of such a subject in the field of international relations." Report, supra note 2, at 116.
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of the individual, as both beneficiary of doctrine and bearer of duties, is
traced through the protection of aliens, agreements specifically conferring
rights upon individuals, humanitarian intervention, crimes against humanity
in the Nuremberg Charter, offences against the law of nations, treaties for
the protection of minorities, the liabilities of individuals as organs of the
state, and the doctrine of the incorporation of international law as the law of
the land. Strongly insisting that the "fact that the beneficiary of rights is
not authorized to take independent steps in his own name to enforce them
does not signify that he is not a subject of the law or that the rights in question
are vested exclusively in the agency which possesses the capacity to enforce
them," r5 Professor Lauterpacht nevertheless reinforces his case by summar-
izing the historical instances in which individuals have been given direct
access to international tribunals for the protection of their rights and he urges
that Article 34 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice should be
amended to give a measure of such access. The factors offered to account
for the increasing concern of international law for the individual include "the
acknowledgment of the worth of human personality as the ultimate unit of
all law," "the realization of the dangers besetting international peace as the.
result of the denial of fundamental human rights," the need for the subjection
of the individual directly to the rule of international law "in a period of history
in which the destructive potentialities of science and the power of the machinery
of the State threaten the very existence of civilized life," and recognition of the
fact that the international interests and contacts across frontiers of individuals
are no longer "rudimentary", as in the beginnings of traditional international
law, but are rather such that "the interdependence of States which requires
regulation is the interdependence of the individuals who compose them."8
From his survey Professor Lauterpacht, therefore, concludes not only that we
may have to revise outmoded conceptions of the "subjects" of international
law but even that we may have "to become more conscious . . . of the justifi-
cation and the practical beneficence of proceeding on the basis of a conception
of international law as being the law not of the society of States but of inter-
national society in all the diversity of its manifestations requiring and admit-
ting of legal regulation by rules other than the municipal law of States."'
In his next section on "The Law of Nature and the Rights of Man" Pro-
fessor Lauterpacht recounts a well-known history of the interrelations of
natural law, the doctrine of natural rights, national constitutions, and inter-
national law and founds contemporary concern for human rights deep in
antiquity and human nature. Though he stresses that "the international
recognition and protection of the rights of man is, in strict juridical logic,
independent of any doctrine of natural law and natural rights"8 and agrees
5. P. 27.
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that the law of nature, like any other form of justification, can be "an instru-
ment of reaction" as well as "a lever of progress," he still insists that concep-
tions of natural law can serve as useful sources of inspiration and sanction for
men of goodwill. The generalizations of "that law of nature which, throughout
the ages, proved to be the principal bearer of the idea of the indefeasible
rights of man" were not speculative, fanciful piroducts, but "were generaliza-
tions from actual experience."9  The authors of these generalizations
"endeavored to form laws of conduct by reference to the nature of man, to his
physical and mental constitution as they saw it, and to his station and purpose
in the scheme of creation as they perceived it from the contemplation of the
world around them."10 Transcending all the vagaries of the philosophers, as
"objective factors" and "productive of laws," are "the social nature of man;
the generic traits of his physical and mental constitution; his sentiment of
justice and moral obligation; his instinct for individual and collective self-
preservation; his desire for happiness; his sense of human dignity; [and] his
consciousness of man's station and purpose in life."'" The degree to which the
founders of contemporary international law, such as Vitoria, Grotius, Vattel,
Wolff, and Puffendorf, drew upon concepts of natural law and concerned
themselves for the individual suggests again a conception of that law as not
merely governing the mutual relations of states, but "as being above the legal
order of sovereign States," as being "the universal law of humanity in which
the individual human being as the ultimate unit of all law rises sovereign
over the limited province of the State."' 2
Coming to his main theme, the analysis of "The Law of the Charter,"
Professor Lauterpacht takes a strong position that the several clauses on
human rights in the United Nations Charter are "no mere embellishment of
a historic document" but add up to legal obligation. The human rights
provisions "figure prominently in the statement of the purposes of the United
Nations" and members "are under a legal obligation to act in accordance with
these Purposes."' 3 The author finds "a mandatory obligation implied in the
provision of Article 55 that the United Nations 'shall promote respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms'" and "a distinct
element of legal duty in the undertaking expressed in Article 56 in which
'All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-opera-
tion with the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55' ,14 The "legal duty to promote respect for human rights includes,"
he elaborates, "the duty to respect them" and "in addition, the obligation to
further the adoption of means and establishment of agencies for the effective
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international enforcement of these rights."' 5 In support he invokes among
other authorities "judicial pronouncements, including those of Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States," in which "these provisions of the
Charter have been treated as a source of self-executory legal obligations
affecting private rights."16
The impact of the "domestic jurisdiction" clause of the United Nations
Charter-Article 2(7) which reads "nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter . ..-
Professor Lauterpacht minimizes by insisting upon a technical meaning for
"intervene" and a lack of any clear meaning for "matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Intervention is interpreted in
the sense of traditional doctrine as implying "a peremptory demand for positive
conduct or abstention-a demand which, if not complied with, involves a
threat of or recourse to compulsion."' 7 This obviously does not refer to "the
procedures of investigation, study, report, and recommendation" by organs of
the United Nations.' 8 Matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state" are few if the reference is to matters which "cannot have interna-
tional repercussions" and it is generally agreed that international agreement
can make matters of international concern.' 9 The United Nations Charter
itself makes "the observance of fundamental human rights and freedoms" a
matter of international concern; the "reservation of domestic jurisdiction"
cannot be made to "accomplish the impossible and combine the acceptance of
obligations with freedom from obligation." 20 To support his position Profes-
sor Lauterpacht offers a careful survey of the history of argument and practice
about "domestic jurisdiction" in the United Nations.
In other chapters Professor Lauterpacht reviews the measures taken in
implementation of the Charter and deplores their timidity and inadequacy.
"The various proposals for a 'Covenant' of Human Rights, the Covenant itself
when adopted, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and similar
drafts and instruments must be regarded," he suggests, "as stages in the
adoption of an International Bill of Human Rights conceived as an effective
part of the law of nations commensurate with the ideals of the charter, the en-
15. P. 152.
16. P. 151. "Self-executory" is not perhaps the best word. It is clear, however,
that judges and other decision-makers in this country regard the United Nations Charter
as a source of crystallized national policy which they must take into account. For the
most careful and measured statements of the impact of the Charter on American law
see Schachter, The Charter and The Constitution: The Hunan Rights Provisions in
American Law, 4 VANiD. L. Rnv. 643 (1951) and Wright, National Courts and Human
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during aspirations of mankind and the requirements of international peace." 21
He presents his own revised draft of such a Bill and explains and justifies
both its substantive and procedural provisions in great detail. He makes a
particularly strong case for "recognition of the effective right of petition by
private individuals and groups." 22 His recommendations and discussion
should be of inestimable value and inspiration to the workers and negotiators
presently engaged with these matters in the United Nations and elsewhere.
In two concluding chapters he appraises the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Proposed European Court and Commission for Human
Rights. Because apparently of concern for future efforts, he offers a low
estimate-perhaps much too low-of the probable influence of the Universal
Declaration on future decisions.
The summary above is but the barest indication of the content of a rich and
powerful book. The reviewer is so much in accord with Professor Lauter-
pacht's major purposes and conclusions that he hesitates to indicate reserva-
tions. It may not, however, weaken general agreement to suggest that some
of the themes of the book could be made even more persuasive. Thus, the
whole controversy about the "subjects" of international law might be more
explicitly recognized as a verbalistic quagmire. The important facts are that
not only nation-states, public international bodies, and individuals but also
transnational political parties, pressure groups, and private associations are
all participants in a world power process; that policy is continually being
formulated and applied on behalf of and for the control of all these participants
on a global scale; and that all of these participants are afforded varying degrees
of access to international and national fora for the protection of their interests.23
Whether an observer labels any one of these participants as a "subject" of
international law or not is entirely a matter of preference in verbal esthetics or
a function of the argument he is trying to win. The support that the great
tradition of natural law gives to community measures for protecting human
rights could, for a second example, be considerably strengthened by a detailed
demonstration of how the findings of contemporary social science about man's
nature and community processes augment and reinforce the wisdom of the
philosophers. 24 The position that Article 2(7) the "domestic jurisdiction"
clause, of the United Nations Charter offers no impediment to the human
rights program might, once again, be strengthened by emphasizing two points:
first, that whatever the clause means it imposes no limits on the power of
21. Pp. 276, 277.
22. P. 302.
23. An analysis of this type could be made to show the irrelevance and anachronism
of such critical reviews as that of Green in 4 INT'L L.Q. 126 (1951).
24. A few examples of the relevant literature are: ADORNO & ASSOCIATES, THE
AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950); Chisholm, The Psychiatry of Enduring Peace,
6 PS'CHIAT'R 3 (1946); DOLLARD, FRUSTRATION AND AGGREssION (1939); LASSWELL,
POWER AND PERSONALITY (1948); KARDiNER & OVESEY, THE MARK OF OPPRESSION
(1951) ; and MALINOWSI, FREEDOM AND CIVILIZATION (1944).
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nation-states to make new agreements; and, secondly, that for ascertaining
any possible limit on the powers of the organization, meaning can only be
given to the phrase "domestic jurisdiction," as a functional equivalent of
"sovereignty" and "independence" and the polar opposite of "international
concern," by locating one's problem in the realities of the contemporary world
power process, which include inescapable interdependences with respect to
human rights. 5 It may be added, finally, that some of Professor Lauterpacht's
comments on United States constitutional law, such as the suggestion that
"the bulk of the provisions of an International Bill of Rights fall, according to
the Constitution, within the province of the States,"26 do not accord with the
best critical thinking in this country.27 These reservations are, however, in
sum but minor. Professor Lauterpacht has given us a book which will do
much to promote a "primary political goal of humanity," the "further trans-
formation of the law of nations from a law* of States to a law of international




PARTNERS IN PROGRESS, A Report to the President by the International
Development Advisory Board, 1951. Pp. v, 120.
MEASURES FOR THE EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT OF UNDER-DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES, Report by a Group of Experts Appointed by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. United Nations, Department of Economic
Affairs: New York, 1951. Pp. ix, 108.
IT is now some two and one-half years since President Truman in the
famous "Point Four" section of his Inaugural address warned of the threat
to American security from poverty and discontent in the backward areas of
the world. In the brief period since that address much has happened to
justify the President's anxiety: the 600 million people of China have fallen
under the control of a hostile Communist regime; aggression in Korea has
cost thousands of United Nations casualties; unrest in Iran has jeopardized
Western access to the oil of the Middle East; and the tempo of Communist
infiltration and military activity has increased all along the continent of Asia.
In view of the speed and gravity of these events, one is prompted to ask what
25. For elaboration see McDougal & Leighton, supra note 2, at 77 et $eq.
26. P. 302.
27. For a comprehensive survey of the impact of the proposed Covenant on federal
and state powers, see Chafee, supra note 2. It is not suggested that Professor Lauter-
pacht's comments are without support in this country. One from abroad may perhaps
be forgiven a choice of false prophets.
28. P. 310.
tWilliam K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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